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Perspectives
The phrase “designer babies” refers to genetic interventions 
into pre-implantation embryos in the attempt to infl uence 
the traits the resulting children will have. At present, this 
is not possible, but many people are horrifi ed by the mere 
thought that parents might want to choose their children’s 
genes, especially for non-disease traits. I want to argue that 
the objections are usually not well articulated, and that even 
when they are, it’s far from obvious that such interventions 
would be wrong. 
What precisely is the objection? Of course, there are safety 
objections, especially ones arising from unforeseen and 
harmful side-eff ects. For example, in mice, researchers have 
shown that the addition of a certain gene made them better 
at running mazes, but also made them hyper-sensitive 
to pain. Such a possibility would rule out most, if not all, 
genetic enhancement. However, safety objections are raised 
by all new technologies, and do not usually instigate calls for 
blanket prohibition. The interesting question is, assuming 
genetic enhancement of the embryo is safe and eff ective, 
may such techniques ethically be used by parents?
Do the critics base their opposition on a general objection 
to the attempt to infl uence children’s traits? Surely not. 
That is exactly what parents are supposed to do. To get 
our children to be healthy, well mannered, intellectually 
curious, and well behaved we control what they eat, have 
them vaccinated, teach them manners, read to them, 
and discipline them when they misbehave. It would be 
absurd for a parent to say, “I never attempt to infl uence 
my children’s development. I just love them for who they 
are.” Thus, it is not infl uencing our children’s traits that is 
objectionable, but rather the means to accomplish this, 
that is, choosing their genes. But even this has to be further 
refi ned, since just the choice of a partner—surely not 
morally objectionable in itself—is a way of choosing our 
children’s genes. As Steven Pinker has put it, “Anyone who 
has been turned down for a date has been a victim of the 
human drive to exert control over half the genes of one’s 
future children.” 
Perhaps the objection is not to exerting control over 
traits, but rather to completely determining in advance 
what traits one’s children will or will not have. Genetic 
interventions, it may be thought, enable more control over 
what our children will be like than other modes of shaping 
children. If this is the objection, it embodies the “fallacy of 
genetic determinism”, the view that our genes determine 
who we are and what we are like. Of course genes play a 
role in the traits we have, but what we are actually like is 
the result of multiple genes interacting with each other, 
and all of them interacting with the environment. In fact, 
even if you could choose the entire genome of a child 
(for example, by cloning), you would not have complete 
control over the child’s traits. As Princeton microbiologist 
Lee Silver has put it, “all that anyone will ever get from 
the use of cloning, or any other reproductive technology, 
is an unpredictable son or daughter, who won’t listen to 
his parents any more than my children will listen to me”. 
Thus, the very term “designer babies” is a misnomer. No 
one will ever be able to design a child, that is, determine 
in advance what talents, skills, abilities, virtues, and vices 
the child will have.
Perhaps the objection is to the fact that the child’s genes 
were chosen for him by his parents, thus forcing the child 
to have certain talents and not others. For example, it 
might be thought that if the child’s parents picked genes 
associated with musical ability, their child would be forced 
to be a musician, when maybe he or she would rather have 
been an athlete. But this makes no sense. Consider a child 
of musicians who inherits musical ability naturally. That 
child may become a musician, but he or she certainly isn’t 
forced to do so because of his genetic inheritance. Far from 
it; if the child doesn’t practice, he won’t become a musician, 
no matter what his genetic make-up. Admittedly, when 
parents choose their children’s genes, they do so without 
the child’s knowledge and consent. However, this is true of 
all of us, not just those who are genetically modifi ed. None 
of us chooses our own genes. What is the moral signifi cance 
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in the fact that our genes were imposed on us due to 
someone’s choice as opposed to just chance?
Some people believe that genetically modifi ed people 
would have personalities, thoughts, and feelings that 
would be less real, less authentic than the personalities of 
non-modifi ed people. But this too makes no sense, as an 
example will reveal. In 2003, Avshalom Caspi and colleagues 
reported in Science that a functional polymorphism in the 
promoter region of the serotonin transporter (5-HTT) 
gene may be associated with a predisposition towards 
depression. Individuals with one or two copies of the 
short allele of the 5-HTT promoter polymorphism become 
depressed more often after stressful events than individuals 
homozygous for the long allele. So if you’re lucky enough to 
have inherited two long alleles of 5-HTT, you may be more 
likely to be a cheerful, resilient sort of person than someone 
who inherited two short alleles. What if it were possible 
to genetically modify embryos to replace the short alleles 
with long ones? Would the resulting people not really be 
as cheerful or resilient as those who naturally inherited the 
long alleles? Of course not.
A more serious objection stems from the idea that people 
who want to choose, in advance, the traits their child will 
have, and are willing to spend so much money to get 
a child with certain traits, demonstrate a kind of desire 
for perfectionism that seems incompatible with being a 
good parent. An insistence on having a child of a certain 
sort, whether a musician or an athlete or a politician, 
amounts to parental tyranny. As Thomas Murray has put 
the point, “When parents attempt to shape their children’s 
characteristics to match their preferences and expectations, 
such an exercise of free choice on the parents’ part may 
constrain their child’s prospects for fl ourishing.” 
An argument related to parental tyranny has been made 
by a member of the US President’s Council on Bioethics, 
Michael Sandel. Sandel suggests that genetic engineering 
threatens what he calls the “ethic of giftedness”. He 
argues that “To appreciate our children as gifts is to 
accept them as they come, not as objects of our design 
or products of our will or instruments of our ambition.” 
This notion of giftedness resonates with many people, 
because it represents an ideal of parenting that most of 
us embrace. Sandel contrasts the ethic of giftedness with 
a style of parenting he calls “hyper-parenting”, which 
ignores the child’s own talents and abilities, and instead 
forces the child to do what will satisfy parental dreams and 
aspirations. A hyper-parent might insist that a child play 
sports, when he or she would rather be in the drama club, 
or that all the child’s free time be spent in pursuit of getting 
into a prestigious university. We can all agree that hyper-
parents are obnoxious, but is there a necessary connection 
between hyper-parenting and interest in genetic 
modifi cation of the embryo? No doubt many hyper-
parents would be interested in genetically modifying their 
embryos, but it doesn’t follow that everyone who would 
opt for genetic modifi cation would be hyper-parents. That 
depends, I think, on the traits chosen, and the reasons for 
choosing them. If the traits sought were ones that could 
reasonably be thought to benefi t the child, whatever path 
the child might choose, traits that would help a person 
fl ourish, traits that good parents would want to instil 
in their children anyway, such as kindness, generosity, 
compassion, or creativity, it is hard to see why choosing 
such traits, by genetic or conventional means, would be 
hyper-parenting.
A fi nal objection to “designer children” is that this would 
exacerbate social diff erences and the gap between rich 
and poor. I seriously doubt that genetic interventions 
would have more of an infl uence than existing causes 
of inequality, such as rotten neighbourhoods and lousy 
schools. In any event, prebirth genetic enhancement could 
be used to combat social inequality, by giving children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds a leg up.
Genetic enhancement of embryos is, for the present, 
science fi ction. Its opponents think that we need to ban it 
now, before it ever becomes a reality. What they have not 
provided are clear reasons to agree. Their real opposition 
is not to a particular means of shaping children, but rather 
to a certain style of parenting. Rather than fetishising the 
technology, the discussion should focus on which parental 
attitudes and modes of parenting help children to fl ourish. 
It may be that giving children “genetic edges” of certain 
kinds would not constrain their lives and choices, but 
actually make them better. That possibility should not be 
dismissed out of hand.
Bonnie Steinbock
Philosophy Department, University at Albany/State University of 
New York, Albany, NY 12222, USA
steinbock@albany.edu
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